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Personal Jurisdiction and the Due
Process Clause: An Evaluation of the
Fairness Factors
While the concept of "minimum contacts" is still hailed as "the
constitutional touchstone" for determining whether an exercise of
personal jurisdiction comports with the due process clause,1 recent
United States Supreme Court decisions reflect a dispute among the
justices over the role of the minimum contacts test vis-a-vis the
fairness factors. 2 The decision of the Supreme Court in Asahi Metal
v. Superior Court' outlines the two divergent positions in this
dispute.4 In Asahi, the Court held that an exercise of jurisdiction
would be unreasonable and unconstitutional based on the fairness
factors, but the justices were equally divided on the issue of whether
the defendant had established minimum contacts.5 According to
Justice O'Connor, minimum contacts is the threshold determination
of what is essentially a two part balancing test.6 First, a court must
1. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1031 (1987);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I
"No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law."
2. See World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 300 (1980) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (Justice Brennan argues that the Court should not mechanically conduct a
minimum contacts test but should focus on the overall reasonableness of jurisdiction); Asahi,
107 S. Ct. at 1031, 1035 (Justices O'Connor, Powell, Rehnquist and Scalia consider the
minimum contacts test the threshold of the personal jurisdiction analysis; Justices Brennan,
Stevens, White, Blackmun and Marshall consider contacts to be one of several factors in
determining the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over the defendant).
3. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
4. Id. at 1031, 1034. See infra text at notes 104-37 (discussion of the Asahi case).
5. 107 S. Ct. at 1031-33, 1035-38. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
6. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1031, 1034. Under this approach, if the defendant has sufficient
minimum contacts, the two part test becomes a balancing test and the court must consider
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determine whether the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts
with the state.7 If there are insufficient minimum contacts with the
forum state, then an assertion of jurisdiction would not meet due
process requirements.8 Under this approach, an examination of other
factors cannot establish the validity of an assertion of jurisdiction;
the fairness factors may be considered only to affirm or defeat
jurisdiction. 9 If the court finds sufficient minimum contacts, how-
ever, jurisdiction is generally valid unless an examination of the
fairness factors indicates that an exercise of jurisdiction would be
clearly unreasonable. 10
In contrast, Justices Brennan, Stevens, White, Blackmun and
Marshall consider this defendant-oriented due process approach
outdated and suggest that minimum contacts is just one factor in
determining the overall reasonableness of personal jurisdiction."
The "Brennan position" advocates a multifactor approach in which
the court considers the following factors to determine whether an
assertion of jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable to the defen-
dant: (1) The defendant's contacts with the forum state; (2) the
inconvenience to the defendant in conducting the suit in that state;
(3) the state's interest in the litigation; (4) the plaintiff's interests
in conducting the suit in the forum state; and (5) the interest of
the interstate judicial system in achieving the most efficient reso-
lution of controversies. 12 Since this analysis emphasizes the reason-
ableness of an assertion of jurisdiction, none of these requirements
the fairness factors to determine whether jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Id. at 1033-
34. "When minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff and
the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the
alien defendant." Id. at 1034. However, if the court does not find minimum contacts, an
examination of the fairness factors is generally unnecessary since an assertion of jurisdiction
would not meet due process requirements. See World-wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 294, 287-299 (1980). Although Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion examined the
fairness factors in Part IIB, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Powell and Scalia stated in Part III that
their decision that an assertion of jurisdiction would be unconstitutional was based on the
lack of minimum contacts. Id. at 1035.
7. Id. at 1031.
8. Id. at 1035.
9. Id. at 1031. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985). The
other factors are: (1) The burden on the defendant; (2) the interest of the forum state in
adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies. Id. at 477.
10. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
11. World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 300-01 (1980) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
12. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77; See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 300-
05.
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are absolute. 3 If a court finds that jurisdiction over the defendant
is reasonable based on these factors, jurisdiction is also constitu-
tional and satisfies the due process requirements of the fourteenth
amendment. 14 Accordingly, this position rejects the notion that a
certain quantum of contacts is needed.' 5 Instead, less significant
contacts by the defendant may suffice when other factors make
personal jurisdiction reasonable and consistent with "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 16
In order to establish which approach is more consistent with the
due process considerations underlying the restrictions on personal
jurisdiction, this comment examines the original due process res-
trictions on personal jurisdiction, the development of the minimum
contacts test and the evolution of personal jurisdiction analysis
through Asahi. 17 Next, this comment reviews and evaluates the
factors which courts currently consider in personal jurisdiction
analysis.18 Finally, this comment suggests that the minimum contacts
test, without consideration of the fairness factors, is sufficient to
ensure that personal jurisdiction over a defendant is reasonable and
consistent with the due process requirements of the fourteenth
amendment.19
I. DUE PROCESS RESTRICTIONS ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. The Origin of Due Process Restrictions on Personal
Jurisdiction
Since Pennoyer v. NefPO was decided in 1877, assertions of
personal jurisdiction by state courts are governed by the due process
13. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 486 (Brennan, J.) "Ve reject any talismanic jurisdictional
formulas, "the facts of each case must [always] be weighed" in determining whether personal
jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice. This approach, does of
course, preclude clear-cut jurisdictional rules. But any inquiry into "fair and substantial
justice" necessarily requires determinations "in which few answers will be written in black
and white. The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable." Id.
at 486 n.29.
14. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 300-301 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15. See id.; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478 (Justice Brennan, in his majority opinion,
rejects the notion that personal jurisdiction might turn on "mechanical tests" (citing
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945))).
16. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 300; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-78.
17. See infra notes 20-137 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 138-96 and accompanying text.
19. See infra text at notes 197-99.
20. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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clause. 21 In Pennoyer, the Court stated that the ability of a state
court to render a valid in personam judgment over a foreign
defendant depends on the "presence" of the defendant within the
state.22 The "presence requirement" reflected two restrictions em-
bodied in the due process clause.23 The first restriction is that a
state's authority to render a judgment over persons or property is
limited by territorial boundaries.2 Pennoyer also established that
since states are independent and equal sovereigns, an assertion of
jurisdiction by a state court outside the boundaries of the state
could interfere with the independence of another state.
25
Subsequent case law expanded state court jurisdiction through
the "consent" and the "doing business" doctrines. 26 Under the
"consent" doctrine, a court may assert jurisdiction over a defendant
on any cause of action arising out of activities which the state has
a right to regulate under the state police power. 27 Since the state
may regulate these activities, the state may also impose conditions
on the conduct of these activities. 28 Thus, by engaging in certain
21. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733. The Court states:
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment ... the validity of... judgments
rendered against nonresidents without personal service of process upon them, or
their voluntary appearance, may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in
the State resisted on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine
the personal rights . . . of parties over whom the court has no jurisdiction do not
constitute due process of law.
Id. See McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957). The fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "No state shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CoNrsT. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
22. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722, 733 (unless a defendant was served process within the
state or voluntarily appeared to defend a suit, a court has no power to render a valid in
personam judgment against the defendant).
23. See generally 2 J. MooRE, J. LucAs, H. FuNK & C. THomrsoN, MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 4.41-1[3] (2d. ed. 1987) [hereinafter MooRt] (discussing Pennoyer and the
resulting due process restrictions on personal jurisdiction).
24. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. See Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defen-
dants, 69 VA. L. REv. 85, 87-88 (1983) (examines the traditional basis of the territorial view
of jurisdiction).
25. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. See generally, Lewis, The Three Deaths of "State
Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction,
58 NoT E DAmE L. Rav. 699, 702-9 (1983) (reviews the historic origins of sovereignty
limitations on personal jurisdiction).
26. See, e.g., Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 165, 167 (1916) (state can exact express
consent from an individual as a condition to engaging in certain types of activity with the
state); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938) (consent to personal jurisdiction by
bringing suit in the state); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927) (use of highways
by nonresidents constitutes implied consent to appointment of agent for sevice of process
on use related causes of action).
27. See Hess, 274 U.S. at 356.
28. Id. at 356.
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activities within the state, the defendant has either expressly or
impliedly "consented" to an assertion of personal jurisdiction on
causes of action arising out of these activities. 29 In contrast, the
"doing business" doctrine is a modification of the "presence"
requirement articulated in Pennoyer. The "doing business doctrine"
deems a corporation "present" in a state for personal jurisdiction
purposes, if the corporation is doing business within that state.30
B. Minimum Contacts as a Basis for Personal Jurisdiction
In the landmark case International Shoe Co. v. Washington,31
the Supreme Court held that due process requires that a defendant
have minimum contacts with a state such that an assertion of
personal jurisdiction over that defendant by a state court does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' '32
The International Shoe Court thus rejected the notion that the
fortuitous presence of the defendant in the forum state is adequate
grounds upon which to exercise personal jurisdiction. 33 The claim
in International Shoe was based on a state statute that allowed the
state commissioner to issue a notice of assessment of delinquent
contributions to the state unemployment fund upon either personal
notice to the employer or by registered mail to the last known
address.3 4 The defendant corporation, claimed that it was not "doing
business" within the state and had no agents within the state upon
whom service could be made. 35 The corporation argued that service
on the corporation's sales solicitor pursuant to state statute was
unconstitutional. 36 The Court, however, noted that the defendant
employed several salesmen who resided in Washington to exhibit
29. See, e.g., Kane, 242 U.S. at 165, 167; Adam, 303 U.S. at 67-68; Hess, 274 U.S. at
356-57. The "consent" doctrine is still a viable doctrine. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985).
30. See Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc, 45 F.2d 139, 141-42 (2d. Cir. 1930)
(enumerates the factors of the "doing business" test). See also 2 MooRE supra note 23, §
4.41-1[11 (discussing the "presence" and "doing business" theories).
31. 326 U.S. 310 (1957).
32. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 312. See generally, Note, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations - An Analysis
of Due Process, 104 U. PA. L. Rv. 381, at 385, 388 (1955) (reviews the facts in International
Shoe and analyzes some of its requirements).
35. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315-16.
36. Id.
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samples and solicit orderg from buyers within the state . 7 These
activities resulted in a substantial volume of merchandise shipped
by the defendant to purchasers within Washington. 8 The Court
indicated that since the defendant received the benefit of state laws
in conducting these business activities, the defendant also incurred
obligations that the laws imposed on these activities. 9 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court declared that the demands of due process may
be met by contacts of the defendant with the forum state which,
"in the context of our federal system of government," make it
reasonable to require the defendant to answer to the consequences
of a suit. 40 The Court explained that the inconvenience to the
defendant in conducting a suit in the forum state is a relevant
consideration. 41 The Court held that since the defendant had engaged
in continuous and systematic forum activities which were related to
the cause of action, an assertion of personal jurisdiction by the
state court would meet the requirements of due process .42
C. The Development of Personal Jurisdiction Analysis
The due process analysis in International Shoe is based on three
considerations that underlie the fairness of asserting jurisdiction
over a defendant based on minimum contacts: (1) Exchange ration-
ale;43 (2) federalism; 44 and (3) inconvenience to the defendant.
45
1. The Exchange Rationale
An assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant who exercises the
privilege of conducting activities within a state is fair because the
defendant receives the benefits of state law and can therefore be
expected to bear the burdens associated with state law. 46 This
37. Id. at 313-14.
38. Id. at 314-15.
39. Id. at 319.
40. Id. at 317.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 320.
43. Id. at 319.
44. Id. at 317.
45. Id. at 317. See Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of
Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEx. L. REv. 689, 698-705 (1987). Professor Stein suggests that
the jurisdictional justifications for minimum contacts are regulatory need, exchange of
burdens for benefits, and convenience. Id.
46. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. See Stein, supra note 45, at 700.
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exchange rationale also underlies the basic framework of the min-
imum contacts test. First, a court must decide whether a defendant's
forum activities have been continuous and systematic or merely
single and isolated. 47 Then the court must: determine whether the
cause of action is related to the defendant's forum activities. 48 In
cases where the defendant has engaged in continuous and systematic
forum activities which are related to the cause of action, jurisdiction
is valid under the holding in International Shoe.49 If the defendant
has a large number of forum contacts, an assertion of jurisdiction
may be reasonable even if the contacts are unrelated, in light of
the benefits the defendant incurred from conducting a large number
of activities within the forum state.50 The justification for this theory
is that a defendant who conducts a large number of activities is
similar to a "resident" who may always be sued in the state of
domicile.5' When a defendant's forum contacts are only single and
isolated, however, a state court may exercise jurisdiction over the
defendant so long as the suit arises out of the activities of the
defendant within the state.5 2
2. Federalism Concerns
The Supreme Court in International Shoe also indicated that
federalism concerns underlie the due process requirement of mini-
47. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-18.
48. Id. See, e.g., Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 607 F.
Supp. 35, 37 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (one of the initial determinations of personal jurisdiction
analysis is whether the cause of action arises from defendant's forum related activities).
49. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320 (the Court determined that defendant's
contacts were continuous and systematic and that the cause of action arose out of these
activities; personal jurisdiction over the defendant was held to be valid); 4 C. WRIGHT &
MI.LER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 1067(1) (1987) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER]
(continuous and systematic contacts by the defendant has been a valid basis for an assertion
of jurisdiction).
50. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. The Court cites the following cases as
examples: Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N.E. D15 (1917) (substantial
activity by corporation in the state). See also Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437 (defendant's forum activities unrelated to the cause of action were substantial;
personal jurisdiction was held proper).
51. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462-63 (1914). "Domicile in the state is alone
sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state's juridiction .... The
state which accords him privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue
of his domicile may also exact reciprocal duties." Id.
52. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (a single insurance contract solicited by defendant from the forum
was sufficient to create the necessary minimum contacts since the cause of action arose out
of the contract).
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mum contacts. 53 Since International Shoe was decided, the concept
of minimum contacts has developed to include certain activities by
defendants outside state borders which cause harm within the state.
5 4
Because of this development, determining whether a certain activity
constitutes minimum contacts with the state has become increasingly
more difficult because the Supreme Court has resorted to ambiguous
phrases as guidelines for jurisdictional analysis." Although the
original determination that a certain activity is a forum contact may
be more difficult under current analysis, the greater significance
accorded to contacts which relate to the cause of action remains
the same.
5 6
If a cause of action arises out of forum activity, an exercise of
jurisdiction by the state court over the defendant does not interfere
with the territorial rights of another state.57 When a state justifies
53. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 312. See also Redish, Due Process, Federalism
and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112, 1118 (1981).
Professor Redish argues that the Court's requirement that contacts be reasonable "in our
federal system of government, makes clear the Court's continued emphasis on federalism
concerns in formulating a due process analysis of state judicial jurisdiction." Id.
54. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22 Il. 2d 432, 435-37, 176
N.E.2d 761, 764-66 (1961) (foreign manufacturer of valve for waterheater, which was sold
in forum state, was subject to personal jurisdiction of forum state court in cause of action
arising out of explosion of water heater in forum state; defendant's contact with the state
was the connection that its products had with the state of purchase). See also Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (Court notes that the substantial amount of
business transacted solely by mall and wire across state lines as a part of modern commercial
life, obviates the need for defendant's physical presence within a state in which business is
conducted in order to be subject to personal jurisdiction).
55. The Supreme Court has been unable to formulate precise guidelines for the terms
"substantial connection" and "purposeful delivery into the stream of commerce." See
World-Wide Volkwagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980) (a state may
constitutionally assert jurisdiction over a defendant that delivers its products into the stream
of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
state). A conflict has arisen, however, based on when a delivery of a product into the stream
of commerce amounts to a purposeful delivery and resulting minimum contacts. See infra
notes 132-39 and accompanying text. See also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474.
56. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8
(1984) (defines specific jurisdiction as jurisdiction which is based on a cause of action that
"arises out of or relates to" forum state activity). See also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473
n.15. "'Specific' jurisdiction differs from 'general' jurisdiction, through which a state
exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the
defendant's contacts with the forum." Id. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77, 82 "(R)elated contacts are
weighed more heavily in favor of jurisdiction than unrelated contacts. Unrelated contacts
must be continuous or substantial but even a single contact may support jurisdiction if
related to the litigation." Id. Professor Brilmayer suggests that substantive relevance to the
cause of action should provide the test for whether a contact is related. Id.
57. Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 88 (a state may legitimately seek to regulate activities
within its own territory). Professor Brilmayer also observes that the distinction between
related and unrelated contacts is rooted in the concept of state sovereignty. Id. at 84.85.
See also Humphreys v. Pierce, 512 F. Supp. 1321, 1325 (W. D. Va. 1981) (when a tort is
committed within the geographical boundaries of the forum state no principle of state
sovereignty is implicated by the assertion of jurisdiction).
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the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on
continuous and systematic activity that did not give rise to the cause
of action, jurisdiction by the court could interfere with the juris-
diction of the state court where the cause of action arose. As the
Supreme Court explained in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Com-
pagnie de Bau.ites5 1 however, the federalism concerns of the due
process clause actually protect the individual liberty interest of the
defendant instead of the territorial rights of the states. 59 Since
sovereignty notions are not an independent requirement, but un-
derlie the requirement of minimum contacts, the defendant can be
subject to general personal jurisdiction on forum contacts unrelated
to the cause of action.
60
3. Inconvenience to the Defendant
The final due process consideration enunciated in International
Shoe is the inconvenience to the defendant of making a defense in
the forum state.6 1 Personal jurisdiction must comport with "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 62 Therefore, in
addition to examining the extent of the defendant's activities in the
forum state, a court must consider the inconvenience to the defen-
dant of conducting a law suit in the forum state. 63
II. THE INTRODUCTION OF OTHER FACTORS INTO PERSONAL
JURISDICTION ANALYSIS
A. From International Shoe to Hanson
Twelve years after International Shoe, the Supreme Court decided
another landmark case, McGee v. International Life Insurance.
4
58. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
59. Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702-03 n.10. In Ireland, the Supreme Court faced the question
whether the discovery sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) of taking the
personal jurisdiction facts as established may be applied to a defendant who failed to comply
with discovery requests with respect to documents establishing personal jurisdiction. Id. at
695. The Court held that the application of the legal presumption to the issue of jurisdiction
does not in itself violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 709.
60. Id. at 702 n.10.
61. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
62. Id. at 316; Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d. Cir. 1930).
63. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317; Hutchinson, 45 F.2d at 141.
64. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). Most of the fairness factors had their origin in the California
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McGee marked the beginning of the Supreme Court's focus on
factors in addition to minimum contacts in determining whether an
assertion of jurisdiction is constitutional under the due process
clause. 6 In McGee, the beneficiary of a life insurance policy pur-
chased by a California resident from an Arizona corporation, sued
the Texas corporation that had assumed the obligation from the
original insurer. 66 International Life Insurance Co., the Texas cor-
poration, sent a reinsurance certificate to the insured in California
which the insured accepted.6 When the insured died and the ben-
eficiary requested payment on the policy, International Life Insur-
ance Co. refused to pay the claim .6  Consequently, the beneficiary
instituted an action in California, the defendant was served with
process by registered mail, and the beneficiary recovered a judgment
against the defendant.
6 9
A California statute allowed the court to assert personal jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations on insurance contract claims by
California residents if the corporation could not be served with
process within the border.70 The United States Supreme Court held
that due process was satisfied because the suit was based upon a
contract which had a "substantial connection" with the state. This
connection existed because the defendant had solicited the contract
from a California resident:7 Furthermore, the state had a significant
interest in exercising jurisdiction over insurance contracts involving
state residents which was reflected in the statutory scheme governing
insurance.72 The Court further indicated that the nationalization of
Supreme Court decision of Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 222, 347 P.2d
1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959). Justice Traynor enunciated factors that may be considered in
determining whether personal jurisdiction over a defendant would be reasonable. Id. at 225-
26, 347 P.2d at 3-4, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 3-4. The factors include: (1) The state's interest in
providing a forum for residents or in regulating the business involved; (2) the relative
availability of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one place rather than
another; (3) the ease of access to an alternative forum; (4) the avoidance of multiplicity of
suits and conflicting adjudications; and (5) the extent to which the cause of action arose
out of defendant's local activities. Id.
65. McGee, 355 U.S. at 222-24. The state court in McGee, considered the state's
"manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurer
refuses to pay claims" and "the inconvenience to the defendant in being held amenable to
suit in the forum state." Id. at 223-24.
66. Id. at 222.
67. Id. at 221.
68. Id. at 222.
69. Id. at 221.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 223.
72. Id.
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commerce has made it less burdensome for a party to defend in a
foreign state court and that any inconvenience to the defendant in
this case did not amount to a denial of due process] 3
In Hanson v. Denckla,74 the Court considered whether the Florida
district court had personal jurisdiction over a Delaware trust com-
pany because the testatrix executed her will in Delaware. 75 The
Court declared that activity by the plaintiff in the forum state
cannot establish minimum contacts by the defendant.76 Rather, the
Court emphasized that in order to exercise personal jurisdiction, a
court must find some act by which the defendant "purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its law. 7 In a
subsequent United States Supreme Court case, World-Wide Volk-
swagen v. Woodson,7 8 the Court endorsed several of the fairness
factors, but failed to clarify how these factors should be valuedT1
B. Recent Supreme Court Decisions
1. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson
In World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,80 purchasers of an
automobile in New York sued the retailer and regional distributor
for injuries incurred in an automobile accident in Oklahoma."' The
distributor did not distribute automobiles in Oklahoma, but did
distribute automobiles in three other states.Y In analyzing whether
the distributor had sufficient minimum contacts with Oklahoma to
maintain an exercise of personal jurisdiction, the Court considered
73. Id. at 223.
74. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
75. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 252-253.
76. Id. at 253.
77. Id.
78. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
79. See id. at 293. The Court listed the following factors: (1) The burden on the
defendant; (2) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest
in obtaining convenient and effective relief, when that interest is not adequately protected
by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the
several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Id. at 294.
80. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
81. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 287.
82. Id. at 289.
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whether the distributor had solicited products in Oklahoma.8" The
Court also examined whether the company had delivered products
into the "stream of commerce" with the expectation that they
would be purchased by consumers in the forum state.8 4 The Court
concluded that because the car could be used in Oklahoma does
not indicate that the defendant could reasonably foresee being
subject to suit there85 and explained that only when a defendant
conducts purposeful activity in a state does the defendant have
notice that it may be subject to suit there. 86
Justice Brennan dissented in World-Wide Volkswagen, and criti-
cized the majority for not giving enough consideration to the interest
of the forum state. 87 Justice Brennan argued that the jurisdictional
inquiry should focus on whether the particular exercise of jurisdic-
tion over the defendant offends "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" and rejected any mechanical tests based on
the quantum of contacts.8 8 He further indicated that, if other
considerations established that jurisdiction would be fair and rea-
sonable, a lesser amount of contacts may suffice to support juris-
diction. 89 These considerdtions include the interests of the state and
other parties in proceeding with the case in a particular forum, and
the actual burden on the defendant in being subject to suit in that
forum.90 A similar approach was adopted in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz,9' for which Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion.
2. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz
The suit in Burger King arose out of Rudzewicz's breach of a
twenty year franchise agreement which he negotiated with the Burger
King branch office in Michigan. 92 The contract stated that all Burger
83. Id. at 296.
84. Id. at 297-98.
85. Id. at 298.
86. Id. at 297.
87. Id. at 299-300.
88. Id. at 300.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 300-01.
91. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
92. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 466-67. See generally, Note, Quest for a Bright Line
Personal Jurisdiction Rule in Contract Disputes - Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 61
WASH. L. REv. 703 (1980) (discussing the impact of Burger King on personal jurisdiction
analysis in contract disputes); Stephens, The Single Contract as Minimum Contacts: Justice
Brennan Has It His Way, 28 WM. & MARY L. R . 89, 101-108 (discussing the facts, holding
and implications of Burger King).
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King operations are conducted and supervised from the Miami
headquarters, that all relevant notices and payments must be sent
there, that the agreements are made and enforced in Miami, and
that all disputes are governed by Florida law.9 3 Furthermore,
throughout the contract disputes, the franchisees communicated with
the Miami headquarters by mail and telephone. 94
In deciding whether the defendant had established minimum con-
tacts with Florida, the Burger King Court enunciated a balancing
approach for determining the constitutionality of an assertion of
personal jurisdiction. 95 Although the Court maintained the minimum
contacts test as the principal inquiry, the Court indicated that
contacts may be considered in light of the following factors to
determine the overall reasonableness of personal jurisdiction: 96 (1)
The burden on the defendant; (2) the interest of the forum state in
adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies;
and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering sub-
stantive social policies. 97 These considerations may establish the
reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum
contacts. 98 Finally, the Court considered whether the possibility of
litigation was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. 99 The Court
emphasized that the contract involved prior negotiations and con-
templated future consequences. 00 The franchisees were aware that
all contract disputes would be governed by Florida law. 01 Accord-
ingly, the defendant could reasonably foresee the possibility of
litigating contract disputes in Florida. 0 2 Since nothing suggested
that an assertion of personal jurisdiction by the state court would
be unreasonable, the Court held that the Florida court's exercise of
93. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480.
94. Id. at 481.
95. See id. at 476-77. See Sonenshein, The Error to a Balancing Approach to the Due
Process Determination of Jurisdiction Over the Person, 59 TEaMP. L.Q. 47, 48 (1986). Several
appellate courts engaged in balancing in diversity cases prior to Burger King. See, e.g.,
Nova Biomedical Corp. v. Moller, 629 F.2d 190 (1st Cir. 1980); Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C
Food Markets, Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Marina
Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1981).
96. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
97. Id. at 477.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 474, 479-80.
100. Id. at 479.
101. Id. at 481.
102. Id. at 482.
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personal jurisdiction over the defendant did not offend due proc-
ess. 1
03
3. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court
The original suit in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,1
04
was a product liability action against a Taiwanese tire manufacturer,
Cheng Shin, and a Japanese component part manufacturer, Asahi. 105
Cheng Shin cross claimed against Asahi for indemnification. 06 After
the plaintiff settled with Cheng Shin and dismissed his claim, Asahi
moved to quash Cheng Shin's service of summons and have the
indemnity claim dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. 107 The
United States Supreme Court held that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by the California court over Asahi was unreasonable
based on a consideration of the fairness factors developed in World-
Wide Volkswagen.""' The Court came to this conclusion by focusing
on the great burden on the foreign defendant in having to conduct
a lawsuit in the forum and the lack of forum state interest in the
litigation. 09The Court was divided, however, on whether the defen-
dant had established minimum contacts based on the "stream of
commerce" test developed in World-Wide Volkswagen.110 Further-
more, the Court failed to address the relationship of the fairness
factors to minimum contacts or the exact weight to be given to
these factors."'
In Part HIA of the plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor considered
whether the mere act of placing a product in the stream of commerce
103. Id. at 487.
104. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
105. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1029. The plaintiff claimed that a defective tire had caused
the motorcycle accident which killed his wife and caused his own injuries. Id.
106. Id. at 1029-30.
107. ITd. at 1030.
108. Id. at 1034. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 290, 292 (1980)
(list of the fairness factors).
109. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1034-35.
110. Id. at 1029, 1032-33 (Justice O'Connor, discussing the dispute among the lower
courts and within the Supreme Court as to what constitutes a purposeful delivery of a
product into the stream of commerce). See also id. at 1035-38 (Justice Brennan concurring
in part but disagreeing with Justice O'Connor on whether the mere placement of a product
in the stream of commerce is sufficient to establish minimum contacts).
111. See infra notes 117-120 and accompanying text. See also Stein, supra note 45, at
'762 (indicating that Asahi highlights the Court's inability to evaluate the jurisdictional
significance of contacts).
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would suffice to allow an exercise of personal jurisdiction."2 O'Con-
nor construed the due process clause as requiring some "additional
conduct" besides the defendant's awareness of product entry into
the forum state through the stream of commerce." 3 Justice O'Con-
nor listed the following activities as examples of conduct that could
indicate a defendant's intent to serve the market in the forum state:
(1) Designing the product for the market in the forum state; (2)
advertising in the forum state; (3) establishing channels for providing
regular advice to customers in the forum state; or (4) marketing
the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the
sales agent in the forum state.14 Justice O'Connor examined whether
the defendant engaged in any of these activities and concluded that
Asahi did not purposefully avail itself of the California market."
5
Thus, the defendant did not have minimum contacts with Califor-
nia."1
6
Justices Brennan and Stevens disagreed with Justice O'Connor's
conclusion that the defendant did not have the requisite minimum
contacts with California." 7 Specifically, Justice Brennan argued that
Justice O'Connor's requirement of "additional conduct" as part of
the stream of commerce test is not a meaningful differentiation
between the various manufacturers who place goods into the stream
of commerce." 8 Justice Brennan contended that the economic ben-
efits derived from the sale of a product in the forum state and the
benefit of the protection of state law accrue to a manufacturer
whenever goods are placed in the stream of commerce." 9
Although Justice Stevens also disagreed with Justice O'Connor's
conclusion that Asahi did not have minimum contacts with Cali-
fornia, he stated that this was one of those rare cases in which a
consideration of minimum contacts is not necessary since an asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction would be clearly unreasonable based
on a consideration of the fairness factors.'20 This pronouncement
indicates Justice Stevens' view that the existence of minimum con-
tacts is not necessarily the threshold determination of personal
112. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1031-33.
113. Id. at 1032-33.
114. Id. at 1033.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1035.
117. Id. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring in part), 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
118. Id. at 1035.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
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jurisdiction analysis in each case. Instead, a consideration of min-
imum contacts is unnecessary if jurisdiction is clearly unreasona-
ble.1 21 Although Justice Stevens has historically been aligned with
Justice Brennan in close personal jurisdiction decisions, Justice
Stevens' theoretical approach differs from Justice Brennan, as Stev-
ens' Asahi concurrence indicates. 122 Justice Stevens' concurrence
implies that he sees personal jurisdiction as a two part analysis
rather than the pure multifactor approach, which includes a mini-
mum contacts determination, advocated by Justice Brennan. Thus
Justice Stevens' concurrence suggests that if either minimum con-
tacts or reasonableness do not exist, jurisdiction is unconstitu-
tional. 2 3 This approach is more similar to Justice O'Connor's
approach than Justice Brennan's approach. As suggested in a pre-
vious section, Justice O'Connor's personal jurisdiction analysis is a
two part test consisting of minimum contacts and reasonableness
which becomes a balancing test once minimum contacts are found
to exist.124 Thus in close personal jurisdiction decisions, the result
may hinge on whether Justice Stevens remains more closely aligned
with Justice Brennan or whether he can be shifted towards Justice
O'Connor's viewpoint.
III. THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN MINIMUM CONTACTS
AND TiE FAIRNESS FACTORS - CURRENT PERSONAL JURISDICTION
ANALYSIS
A. Minimum Contacts
All personal jurisdiction decisions must commence with an eval-
uation of whether the activities of a defendant within the forum
may be characterized as continuous and systematic or single and
isolated, and whether the cause of action is related to these activi-
ties. 25 A court may assert "general" jurisdiction over an unrelated
cause of action only if the defendant has conducted substantial
121. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1038.
122. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1038.
123. See id.
124. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
125. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-320 (1945).
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continuous and systematic activities within the state. 126 If a cause
of action is related, a single act by the defendant may be sufficient
to establish specific personal jurisdiction. 12 In making these char-
acterizations, the court must examine the facts to determine whether
the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state.1 2 The determination
of this issue proceeds along different lines depending on whether
the case involves a contract, manufacturer product liability or a
single tort dispute. 29
In contract cases, "purposeful availment" means that the defen-
dant has a "substantial connection" with the forum state arising
from the contract. 30 In Burger King, the prototype contract case
in a personal jurisdiction context, the defendant had a substantial
connection with the forum state because his contract created con-
tinuing obligations between himself and residents of the forum
state.'13 In manufacturer product liability actions "purposeful avail-
ment" also depends on the expectation of the defendant of deriving
benefits from activities in the forum state. 3 2 In such cases, the test
enunciated in World-Wide Volkswagen is applicable. Under this
test, the court must determine whether the defendant purposefully
delivered products into the "stream of commerce" with the expec-
tation that they would be purchased by consumers in the forum
state.133 In Asahi, the Supreme Court was divided on the issue of
the requirements of the stream of commerce test. 34 Justice O'Con-
nor's opinion listed several activities which would indicate to a court
that the defendant purposefully placed products into the "stream
of commerce" and directed the products at forum state consum-
ers. 35 The Asahi concurrences, on the other hand, did not require
that a defendant engage in "additional conduct" to indicate pur-
126. See Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952).
127. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 n.18 (1985). See International
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223
(1957) (a single insurance contract solicited by defendant from the forum state was sufficient
to create minimum contacts since the cause of action arose out of the contract).
128. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1031; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; World-wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980) (citing Hanson); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 253 (1958).
129. See infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
130. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
131. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480.
132. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 296-98.
133. Id. at 298.
134. See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
135. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033.
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poseful delivery of products into the "stream of commerce."' 13 6
Thus, whether certain activity amounts to minimum contacts under
a stream of commerce analysis remains subject to different inter-
pretations. 
137
B. The Reasonableness of An Assertion of Personal Jurisdiction
1. Current Due Process Considerations
Under current personal jurisdiction analysis, the minimum con-
tacts test is construed as imposing a dual limitation on an assertion
of jurisdiction.138 First, federalism concerns underlying the minimum
contacts requirement are viewed as a due process limitation on
personal jurisdiction over a defendant. 39 Second, courts believe that
the minimum contacts test protects defendants from burdensome
and inconvenient litigation.' 40 In Hanson v. Denckla,14 1 for example,
the Supreme Court declared that personal jurisdiction restrictions
are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the
respective states and a protection of the defendant from inconven-
ient litigation. 42 The Supreme Court further explained the due
process restrictions in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son. 43 The Court stated that:
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn can be seen to perform
two related, but distinguishable functions. It protects the defendant
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.
And it acts to ensure that the states through their courts do not
136. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
137. Felix v. Bomoro Kommanditgesellschaft, 196 Cal. App. 3d 106, 114, 241 Cal. Rptr.
670, 674 (1987).
138. See Empire Abrasive Equip. Corp. v. H. H. Watson Inc., 567 F.2d 554, 557 (3d
Cir. 1977) (the twin limitations of the due process clause over state judicial power are
federalism concerns and fairness to the defendant); Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp. v. Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co., 607 F. Supp. 35, 37 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (the twin limitations of the due
process clause on personal jurisdiction are federalism concerns and fairness to the defendant).
See also, infra text accompanying note 144.
139. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie de Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10
(1982).
140. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-93 (1980).
141. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
142. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251.
143. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as
coequal sovereigns in a federal system.
144
Some commentators have construed the Court's assertion that the
minimum contacts test protects an individual liberty interest, in
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie de Bauxites,145 as a retreat
from the theory that federalism concerns underlie the due process
restrictions on personal jurisdiction.146 The context of the statement,
however, indicates that the Court simply intended to explain the
proper role of federalism concerns rather than abandon those con-
cerns altogether. 147 In a footnote to Ireland, the Court explicitly
recognized that due process restrictions on personal jurisdiction
reflect an element of interstate federalism and cited the section in
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson quoted above.148 The Court
explained, however, that due process limitations on personal juris-
diction primarily protect an individual liberty interest.
49
Lower federal court decisions after Ireland, have continued to
construe the dual function of the minimum contacts test as a
protection of both the defendant and the federalism interest.
5
Consequently, the assertion of the Supreme Court that the due
process clause protects the individual's liberty interest, can be con-
strued to mean that there is no independent sovereignty restriction
on the ability of a court to assert personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. However, one of the functions of the minimum contacts
test is to protect the state's sovereignty interest.'
51
144. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291-92. Furthermore, the Court declared that
although the burden on the defendant is a primary concern in determining the reasonableness
of jurisdiction, the burden may be considered in light of other factors including the plaintiff
and forum state's interest in conducting the litigation in that particular state. Id. at 292.
145. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
146. See Note, Bauxites's "Individual Liberty Interest" and the Right to Control Amen-
ability to Suit in Personal Jurisdiction Analyis, 51 FoRDHAM L. Rv. 1278, 1289 (interprets
the Supreme Court's statement in Ireland as removing sovereignty concepts from jurisdiction
analysis); Redish, supra note 53, at 1113-15 (asserting that federalism is irrelevant to due
process limits on personal jurisdiction).
147. Stein, supra note 45, at 711-12.
148. Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702-03 n.10.
149. Id.
150. See Home v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1982) (fifth amendment
due process case which relies on the fourteenth amendment due process analysis in Paolino
v. Channel Home Centers, 668 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1981), decided prior to Ireland, which
discussed both federalism concerns and fairness to the defendant); Allegheny Ludlum Steel
Corp. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 607 F. Supp. 35 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (recognizes federalism
concerns as one of the limitations inherent in the due process clause restriction on personal
jurisdiction).
151. See Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702 n.10. See also WIGar & MnLER, supra note 48, 1067.
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The Supreme Court is also divided over the appropriate weight
of the fairness factors in relation to minimum contacts and the
reasonableness of an assertion of personal jurisdiction. 5 2 The plu-
rality opinions in Asahi, suggesting the proper analyses of minimum
contacts and the fairness factors, reveal the two divergent positions
on this issue. In order to evaluate the constitutional soundness of
these positions, it is useful to compare the results the court would
be likely to reach in three hypothetical fact patterns. The first
hypothetical scenario is one in which the court has found that there
are sufficient minimum contacts. In this case the Justice O'Connor
group would consider jurisdiction unreasonable only in rare cases
when the burden on the defendant is very great and the interest of
the plaintiff and the forum state are slight. 53 The group of justices
represented by Justices Brennan and Stevens, would also give con-
siderable weight to minimum contacts but would emphasize that
jurisdiction must be reasonable considering all the factors.' 54 Nev-
ertheless, both positions would most likely arrive at the same result
since even the Brennan group imposes a heavy burden on the
defendant to prove that jurisdiction is unreasonable once minimum
contacts have been established. 155
A second possible fact situation is one in which the defendant
had no contacts with the forum state. This fact situation is similar
to Hanson v. Denckla,56 in which a unanimous Court declared that
Sonenshein, supra note 95, at 59. Federalism concerns only underlie the due process
limitations on personal jurisdiction of state courts and federal courts hearing diversity cases.
See Handley v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1271 (6th Cir. 1984).
152. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987) (4-4 split
among the justices on whether there are minimum contacts based on delivery of products
into the stream of commerce, and on the appropriate significance of these contacts in light
of the fairness factors). See also Sonenshein, supra note 95, at 56.
153. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1034. Justice O'Connor stated that "When minimum contacts
have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of
jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the defendant." Id. Justice
O'Connor, however, conceded that in Asahi these factors reveal the "unreasonableness of
the assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi, even apart from the question of the placement of
goods in the stream of commerce." Id.
154. See World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 300 (1980) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (Justice Brennan argues that the Court should not mechanically conduct a
minimum contacts test but should focus on the overall reasonableness of jurisdiction).
155. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985). Justice Brennan,
the author of the opinion, states that a defendant who has purposefully directed his activities
at the forum state "must present a compelling case that the presence of some other
consideration would render jurisdiction unreasonable." Id. at 487. Justices Stevens, Black-
mun and White may never reach the issue of minimum contacts if jurisdiction would be
unreasonable. See Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). See also supra
notes 120-124 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Stevens' concurrence.
156. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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in order to be subject to personal jurisdiction, a defendant must
have purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the state. 57 Even Justice Brennan has never sug-
gested that jurisdiction could be created with reasonableness factors
alone, absent the requisite minimum contacts.'58 Thus, both posi-
tions in this case would agree that an assertion of jurisdiction would
be unconstitutional.
Only in the final hypothetical situation would the difference in
approaches create two different results. This third situation could
arise when, although the defendant arguably has some contacts, the
court is unable to determine whether they are sufficient contacts
upon which to exercise personal jurisdiction. For example, in a
contracts case, a court might have difficulty in determining whether
a contract has substantial connection with the forum state; or, in
a product liability case, a court might have difficulty in deciding
whether the defendant purposefully directed products into the stream
of commerce with the expectation that they would be purchased by
forum state consumers. Under this hypothetical scenario, the ap-
proaches would differ in two respects. First, the Brennan group
would be more likely to find minimum contacts since they do not
believe in a mechanical requirement of contacts. 159 Next, assuming
that jurisdiction in the forum state would be reasonable, the Brennan
group would hold that less significant contacts may be sufficient to
create jurisdiction if the fairness factors would make an assertion
of personal jurisdiction reasonable. 60 An imposition of jurisdiction
under this situation would generally require that the burden on the
defendant of litigating in the forum state be negligible and that the
interests of both the plaintiff and the forum state be significant.
157. Id. at 253. See also International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (the
due process clause will not permit jurisdiction by a state court in a state with which the
defendant has no contacts).
158. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and White, however, stated that "An
examination of minimum contacts is not always necessary to determine whether a state
court's assertion of personal jurisdiction is constitutional." Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1035
(Stevens, J., concurring in part). Stevens' cite to Burger King indicates that a court may
not have to determine minimum contacts in cases where jurisdiction would be extremely
unreasonable. See id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985)).
See also supra notes 120-24.
159. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 301 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
160. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 477 U.S. 462, 477 (1985). Justice Brennan,
in dictum, states that "these considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness
of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of contacts than would otherwise be required." Id.
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The O'Connor position, on the other hand, would be unlikely to
find personal jurisdiction over the defendant in this case.' 6' Once
minimum contacts have been established, the O'Connor position
would allow consideration of the fairness factors to affirm or defeat
jurisdiction. However, this group would not allow the threshold
level of the defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state to
be established through an examination of the interests of the other
participants in the litigation.' 62 In order to determine which of these
two approaches is more viable, each of the fairness factors will be
examined in light of relevant due process considerations.
63
IV. THE FALNRss FACTORS
A. The Burden on the Defendant
Both the Brennan and the O'Connor approaches view the burden
or inconvenience on the defendant as a primary factor for jurisdic-
tional analysis.'r In Asahi, Justice O'Connor's opinion on the
unreasonableness of an assertion of jurisdiction examined this factor
by focusing on the distance between the home of the defendant and
the forum state and the fact that the defendant would be subject
to a foreign nation's judicial system.1 65 Justice Brennan suggested
that the burden of litigation on the defendant should be determined
in light of the benefits the defendant has received through con-
ducting activities in the forum, and whether litigation in the forum
would cause undue surprise to the defendant.' 66 In the area of
choice-of-law, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has been interpreted to assure the defendant fundamental
161. See Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1031 (minimum contacts must be based on an act by the
defendant).
162. Id.
163. See generally, Redish, supra note 53 (discussing the proper role of federalism
concerns in personal jurisdiction analysis and concluding that a due process test should
primarily focus on convenience factors and the burden of litigating in a particular forum);
Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IovA L. Rav. 1015 (1983)
(arguing that federalism concerns exist as a byproduct of a defendant's right to be free
from the judicial authority of states lacking minimum contacts).
164. World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (majority
opinion); id. at 300-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165. Asahi, 107 S. Ct at 1034.
166. Id. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
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fairness. 67 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that,
although an examination of contacts for choice-of-law and personal
jurisdiction may result in different conclusions, both inquiries are
closely related and depend on similar considerations. 6a In Burger
King, both the majority and the dissent recognized that due process
would be offended if an assertion of jurisdiction would be funda-
mentally unfair. 69 This "burden factor" was also one of the original
due process considerations in International Shoe. 170 Therefore, this
factor has constitutional significance, apart from minimum contacts,
in personal jurisdiction analysis in considering fundamental fairness
to the defendant. '71 Since the due process clause protects defendants
from overly burdensome litigation, a consideration of the "burden
factor"' is essential in order to preserve defendants' due process
rights.1 2
B. The Plaintiff's Interest in Obtaining Convenient and Effective
Relief
This factor inquires into the plaintiff's interest in litigating in a
particular forum. Since the due process clause protects the liberty
and property interest of the defendant, it is difficult to understand
why this consideration should rise to the level of constitutional
significance.17 3 Furthermore, even if a state court cannot assert
personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant, the plaintiff is
generally not without a remedy since a suit can be brought in the
defendant's home state or nation. 7 4 In some cases, the additional
expense involved in foreign litigation might prevent the plaintiff
from suing. Even if the plaintiff does not have an alternative
167. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 317 n.23 (1981).
165. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 224-25 (1977).
169. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 489 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice
Stevens joined by Justice White indicated that they would have found jurisdiction funda-
mentally unfair).
170. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317. See supra notes 45, 61-
63 and accompanying text.
171. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980).
172. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction. A Historical-
Interpretive Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (part 2),
14 CREIGHToN L. REv. 735, 842-46 (1981) (the actual burden on the defendant in defending
in the forum state is a relevant issue to the due process right to be heard).
173. See Sonenshein, supra note 95, at 58.
174. Id.
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American forum, however, the Supreme Court has not accepted a
"jurisdiction by necessity" argument as a constitutional jurisdiction
doctrine.
175
C. The Interest of the Forum State in Adjudicating the Dispute
Since the Supreme Court has been unable to clarify the proper
significance of this factor, there is considerable confusion over the
extent to which federalism concerns are important in explaining the
constitutional restrictions on personal jurisdiction.176 Recently, in
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie de Bauxites,177 eight
justices agreed on two considerations that underlie personal juris-
diction analysis: (1) The personal jurisdiction requirements imposed
by the due process clause recognize and protect an individual liberty
interest; (2) the minimum contacts test reflects an element of fed-
eralism. 178 The Court explained that the federalism theory described
in World Wide Volkswagen, must ultimately be considered a func-
tion of the individual liberty interest preserved by the due process
clause. 79 The holding in Ireland is consistent with International
Shoe since both cases recognized that the due process clause pri-
marily serves to protect defendants from unreasonable assertions of
jurisdiction rather than to explicitly protect the sovereignty of the
states. 80
Justice Brennan's approach in World-Wide Volkswagen, Burger
King and Asahi requires the balancing of various factors along with
the amount of contacts to determine the reasonableness of jurisdic-
tion. However, this approach may result in inconsistencies in the
determination of the constitutionality of jurisdiction. For example,
a defendant with the same level of contacts with two states may be
sued on the same cause of action unrelated to these contacts in
175. Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HAv. L. REV. 622, 647 (1988).
See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 n.13 (1984) (the
Court refused to consider the plaintiff's jurisdiction by necessity argument).
176. See Lewis, supra note 25 at 699, 727-39, 742 (1983) (reviewing the Supreme Court's
vacillating pronouncements on sovereignty considerations inherent in the area of personal
jurisdiction and urging that personal jurisdiction should maintain an individual rights focus).
177. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
178. Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702 n.10.
179. Id.
180. Sonenshein, supra note 95, at 58. See also Redish, supra note 53, at 1137 (the only
due process concern of jurisdictional analysis should be the avoidance of inconvenience to
the defendant).
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both State A and State B. If State A has a weak interest in regulating
the activity which created the cause of action, an assertion of
jurisdiction in light of the moderate amount of contacts will be
characterized as unreasonable. However, if State B has a strong
regulatory scheme governing the activity which creates the cause of
action, the court will probably find that less significant contacts
suffice where other relevant factors make an assertion of jurisdiction
reasonable. Thus, the defendant could be deprived of his property
in one state but not in the other state. The due process clause as
interpreted in International Shoe is supposed to ensure that a
defendant bears only the burden of having to defend a suit in a
forum where he had the privilege of conducting activities and where
he benefitted from the protection of the state's laws.131 In this case,
however, the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant in forum
B would depend on the interests of the state rather than on the
extent of activities by the defendant. "Traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice" could not contemplate such an unfair
result.
Although the Court has seemingly rejected federalism concerns
as an independent limitation on personal jurisdiction,' 82 the interest
of the forum state in litigating the case remains one of the factors
which the court considers in determining the reasonableness of
allowing an exercise of personal jurisdiction. 83 A forum state has
two interests in the litigation of a cause of action.1 84 First, every
state has an interest in providing an available forum for state
residents to adjudicate their causes of action. 185 However, the home
state of the defendant has an equally strong interest in providing
the defendant with the protection of the state courts, and an interest
in preventing overreaching by other states. Given these conflicting
interests, this factor should not affect personal jurisdiction by a
state court over the defendant.
181. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-320 (1945).
182. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
183. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980) (consid-
ered forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute a relevant factor); Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (considered forum state's interest in adjudicating
the dispute a relevant factor).
184. See Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 106-07.
185. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (forum state has a manifest
interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents). See Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1034 (1987) (since plaintiff was not a forum state
resident, forum state's interest in the dispute was significantly diminished). See also Brilmayer
supra note 56, at 107; Sonenshein, supra note 95, at 58.
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The second interest is the interest of the state in regulating
activities that occur within its borders. 8 6 This interest, however, is
already protected in two appropriate ways.8 7 First, the minimum
contacts test itself distinguishes between causes of action which arise
out of, or relate to, activities by the defendant in the forum state
and causes of action which do not arise out of the activities of the
defendant within the forum. 8 Generally, a state court has a legit-
imate interest in applying its laws to activities occurring within the
state.8 9 This interest is adequately protected by allowing the court
personal jurisdiction over causes of action which arise out of forum
activities. 90 Since the substantive law of the state defines the ele-
ments of a cause of action, the interest of a state in regulating
intrastate activities is adequately protected by this requirement.''
Second, choice-of-law regulations adequately protect the interest of
the state in applying state law to causes of action arising within the
state,'9 2 although the Supreme Court has recognized that an exam-
ination of the defendant's contacts with the state may result in
different conclusions for personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law
issues.,93
D. The Interest of the Interstate Judicial System in Adjudicating
the Dispute and the Shared Interest of the Several States in
Furthering Fundamental Substantive Policies
Finally, consideration of the interstate judicial system's interest
in adjudicating the dispute and the shared interest of the several
states in furthering fundamental substantive policies, give little
guidance in deciding why a defendant should be subject to the
personal jurisdiction of a particular state court. These considerations
may possibly be more meaningful when the court decides whether
186. See Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 106.
187. Id.
188. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
189. See Redish, supra note 53 at 1139. "A state's legitimate interest in a particular
dispute-other than the provision of a convenient forum for its citizens - is limited primarily
to having its body of substantive law control the outcome, for it is primaril5 through its
substantive law that a state's policy goals are attained." Id.
190. Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 106.
191. Id.
192. Sonenshein, supra note 95, at 58 (the' author states that choice-of-law provisions
govern a claim irrespective of jurisdiction).
193. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 317 n.23 (1981).
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ai state court should have personal jurisdiction -over. an alien defen-
dant.' 94 As the Supreme Court recognized in Asahi, a consideration
of this factor as applied to an alien defendant would require a
court %examinatim of the procedural and substantive policies of
other nations.' 95 The Supreme Court has warned that this inquiry
requires great care and reserve by the court.' 96
V. CONCLUSION
The due process considerations established in International Shoe
are adequately protected by the minimum contacts test. The due
process protections afforded defendants by the Constitution should
not be diluted by the Supreme Court by requiring a consideration
of the fairness factors.' 97 Since the Supreme Court has not specified
the weight to be given to the fairness factors, consideration of these
factors makes an assertion of jurisdiction both arbitrary and un-
predictable.'9 Furthermore, the interests supposedly protected by
consideration of these factors are in fact either inappropriate due
process concerns or are already protected in other ways. Therefore,
due process merely requires minimum contacts based on a defen-
dant's substantial or related forum activity for valid exercise of in
personam jurisdiction by a court. Once minimum contacts have
been established, the court should dismiss the case only where the
burden on the defendant is so great that it amounts to a denial of
fundamental fairness.' 99 If the defendant lacks sufficient minimum
194. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1034-35 (consid-
eration by the Court of the procedural and substantive policies of other nations requires
great care and reserve and a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of
jurisdiction and an unwillingness to find the serious burdens on the alien defendant
outweighed by minimal plaintiff and forum state interest).
195. Id.
196. Id. See United States v. First Nat. City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
197. Lewis, supra note 25, at 739 (arguing that due process protects purely personal
rights and that the Court should repudiate not just the sovereignty but also the governmental
interest factors).
198. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). The
Court asserted that the due process restrictions ensure "the fair and orderly administration
of the laws" and give a greater degree of predictability to the legal system. However, since
the Supreme Court has given an ambiguous analysis of the due process requirements in the
most recent cases, the goal of predictability cannot be realized. Id.
199. Asahi may have been such a case. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. See
also Redish, supra note 53, at 1141-42. (If the burden caused by the assertion of jurisdiction
would be so oppressive as to threaten the defendant's ability to obtain a fair trial, the state
court should not be allowed to assert jurisdiction under any circumstance); supra notes 167-
71 and accompanying text.
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contacts, however, the inquiry should cease and the court should
dismiss the case.
Charlotte Hoffmann
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